Thailand Crisis, reform and recovery

This chapter argues that the Bank of Thailand (BOT) made two egregious policy blunders. First were the futile and costly defense of the baht during late 1996 and the first half of 1997. Second was the bleeding of the Thai government's Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) to prop up failing financial institutions, while neglecting to take actions to remedy the underlying structural problems in the financial and banking sector. Drawing on the Bank of Thailand's published materials, the chapter suggests that Thailand's long period of economic boom had lulled the technocrats into complacency. Unlike earlier financial crises in the developing world, where governments over-borrowed until they were forced to seek a bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or a multilateral debt rescheduling from externally-based creditors, the Thai crisis was rooted in the private sector.
[2018]

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